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Martijn Konings has given us an elegant, erudite book that points to the centrality of
speculation – and a speculative logic of time – in modern political economy. At the heart of
Konings’ thesis is a stark refusal to accept the ontological dichotomy between real and
fictitious economies that drives so much critical and heterodox economic scholarship.
Speculation, he argues, does not represent a rupture from the ‘real’ world of value and
production that faces a comeuppance in moments of crisis as its fictions are forced to
confront reality. Instead, speculation is the driving force behind modern finance and its central
feature, money, both of which operate through a pre-emptive temporal logic: money’s value is
always dependent on securing an uncertain future.
Konings develops this conception of capital’s temporality through a particularly powerful
concept – that of leverage. If the value of a given financial institution’s credit depends on its
actualization in an unknown future, then it also depends on others’ accepting it as valuable. If
that bank can convince enough others of its credit’s value – and can integrate them into its
network – then it will help to secure its future value. The kind of leverage that is at the heart of
this process of producing monetary value is therefore not only contingent and speculative, but
is also immensely social and political. It is not just institutions but people, objects, and
expectations that must all be drawn together if the neoliberal bet is to succeed.
It is this concept of leverage, I will argue here, that is Koning’s most important
contribution to an immanent theory of the logic of neoliberal finance. However, the true
potential of this concept – and its capacity to overcome the dualism of the ideal and material
– has yet to be fully realized in this book. Although Konings takes great care to tell a nuanced
story, grounding his bigger theoretical claims in the more mundane stuff of history, the book at
times feels driven by a particular telos, such that the rise and resilience of neoliberalism
seems almost inevitable – the neoliberal ‘imaginary’ working its magic without much obvious
connection to the contestations, failures, and messy materiality of human life. But how exactly
did the neoliberal imaginary that Konings describes so eloquently gain this much traction?
Was its speculative temporality smoothly translated into practice from the writings of Hayek
and others (as Konings seems to suggest), or was its production a messier, more contested,
and more contingent affair? In this brief commentary, I will go back to one of the key historical
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moments that he examines, the Volcker shock of 1979-82, and examine some of the more
mundane political and technical struggles that defined the early Reagan Administration’s
efforts to put the neoliberal speculative logic into practice.
In revisiting this moment in time, I will be taking a path that Konings flags at various
points in the book itself without ever quite following, but which I believe would ultimately both
substantiate and complicate some of the most important insights of his book. That path
involves a more thorough engagement with the materiality of the speculative logic of neoliberal
finance, drawing on some of the theoretical approaches that Konings identifies in the book –
new materialism, the social studies of finance, cultural economy and, above all, actor network
theory (at least in its earlier incarnations). A more substantial engagement with the insights
from these theories would help to move Konings’ analysis further towards the kind of
immanent ontology he gestures towards in the book, and which is at the heart of many (if not
all) of the philosophers that he engages, allowing us to understand the material work that is
needed to produce and reproduce the speculative temporality of neoliberalism.
In reading Konings’ treatment of money as leverage, I was immediately struck by its
parallels with actor network theory’s concepts of enrollment and inscription. In their earlier
work, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979) sought to make sense of the scientific process.
Rather like the character of money in Konings’ analysis, they found the value and security of
certain scientific findings weren’t simply given, but had to be actively produced – not only
through the marshalling and manipulation of objects in the lab, but also through the
translation of initial findings into various inscriptions (such as scientific papers, standards,
metrics, devices, and so on). Yet, for these inscriptions to have value – like money – they
needed to circulate, to be known, to be perceived as facts, and to be acted on as if they were
facts. Thus, the complex social networks that make up academia and its relations with
government, business, and the wider population remain vital to the production and validation
of any scientific fact. Bringing Konings’ insights to bear in this other domain, one could thus
argue that scientific research, like credit-making, is characterized by a speculative temporality
that relies on a kind of pre-emptive leverage for its ongoing validation.
Yet, we might also want to bring some of the insights from this earlier incarnation of actor
network theory to bear on Konings’ analysis as well. For what we discover when we read early
actor network theory analyses of scientific practice is just how thickly material and social these
valuation processes are. In the lab, the scientist makes use of a range of devices and objects
that are themselves at least in part social products – metrics, procedures, and even animals
like the genetically engineered fruit flies and mice whose standardization is so crucial to the
production of stable and reproducible scientific findings. Moreover, if the scientist’s laboratory-
based findings are to become facts in the ‘outside’ world (a distinction that ultimately breaks
down), the scientist must also try to remake and stabilize that world into something that partly
resembles the lab for her findings to be successfully translated there. Latour’s book on
Pasteur, for example, describes how the scientist sought to extend his initial experiments on
vaccination into the field, requiring farmers to disinfect, record, and otherwise help to
reproduce the laboratory’s conditions (Latour, 1993: 151-52).
Crucially, all of these processes are fragile, contingent, and prone to failure. So much can
and does go wrong – not just in how the humans involved behave, but also in the objects
themselves, which don’t always do what they are supposed to do – like the scallops who
refuse to anchor, and thus be enrolled, in Callon’s (1986) discussion of the political economy
of St. Brieu Bay. Yet scientific facts continue to be produced through hybrid processes that are
both highly technical and immensely political, extremely powerful but also always fragile.
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Although lab mice and scallops might seem a very long ways indeed from the world of
finance, it is not hard to see why many scholars operating with the field of science and
technology studies have found the study of economic theory and practice to be so interesting.
And while Konings (2018: 40-43) is right to challenge some of these theorists’ more recent
work on finance for sometimes vacillating between naïve realism and idealism, there are still
some very useful ideas contained in these earlier analyses of the ways in which scientific facts
come to be produced and valorized.
Was neoliberalism’s pre-emptive temporal logic translated transparently into institutional
life, or did it require the production of new metrics and technologies? I think that if we borrow
some of the insights from more immanent perspectives, we may find we can trace and track
its emergence and contestation over a host of meso-level practices that worked to anchor the
new meanings of the emergent neoliberal order and validate their claims to facticity. The
example of the invention of double-entry bookkeeping that Konings (2018: 73-4) introduces at
one point is instructive here. Konings convincingly argues that part of the significance of this
accounting innovation was the way in which the new ledgers made the uncertainty of financial
futures not only visible but also actionable. These very concrete new accounting practices
played a central part in the development of the speculative temporality of finance.1
In fact, there are a good number of such key moments in which changes to the metrics
and instruments of financial management helped to nudge practices either towards (or
sometimes away from) the speculative world in which we now live. While Donald MacKenzie
and others have identified a number of more recent moments (MacKenzie, 2007; Millo and
MacKenzie, 2009), I would like to turn to one that Konings identifies as a turning point of sorts
in his book: the Volcker shock of 1979-82. The Federal Reserve Board’s decision, in October of
1979, to explicitly adopt a monetarist strategy and begin reducing the expansion of the money
supply was undoubtedly a crucial step in the emergence of the contemporary neoliberal
financial system. Konings goes as far as to suggest that it was Paul Volcker’s move that
ultimately led to the expansion of the shadow banking system, and thus the return of free,
speculative finance (Konings, 2018: 28, 110). He acknowledges that the monetarist
experiment itself was ultimately deemed a failure, but argues that it was Volcker’s willingness
to gamble on a dramatic rupture with the past, and to court a productive kind of failure, that
made this such a formative moment in neoliberalism’s rise.
There is no doubt that Volcker, like many other conservative political and economic
figures of the time, was hoping that the Fed’s dramatic announcement of its shift to
monetarism would help to shock the public into scaling back its inflationary expectations.
There is also little doubt that, as Konings so powerfully argues here and in his earlier book, the
appeal of neoliberal economic theories at this difficult political time was as much emotional
and moral as it was technical (see Konings, 2015). And yet, if we look a little more closely at
the unglamorous techniques and metrics that were required to make this shift possible, we
find a much more material, contingent, and politically contested set of practices at work. It
turns out that it wasn’t very easy to take the speculative logic contained in monetarism,
Hayekian theory, and new classical theory and make it visible and actionable in a way that was
politically viable.
I have argued elsewhere that the most interesting and significant failures are the
contested failures – those that lead to a fundamental debate about the metrics that define
success itself (Best, 2014). The failure of monetarism – and, equally importantly, of supply-
side economics – was profoundly contested. Even among neoliberal ‘true believers’, like the
economists on the President’s Economic Advisory Board (who included Milton Friedman and
Alan Greenspan), there was enormous debate about what was going wrong and why.2 This
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debate became particularly acute in 1982, as the recession that President Reagan’s advisors
had promised would be mild, proved to be anything but, and as the effects of Reagan’s tax
cuts and defense spending, combined with the automatic stabilizers that kicked in during the
recession, started to produce projections of extremely high future deficits – forcing a dramatic
set of revisions to the initially very optimistic projections presented in February 1981 when
Reagan introduced his economic plan.
Drawing inspiration from Koning’s insights into the speculative character of financial
governance, we can see how crucial these projections of a particular kind of economic future
in fact were. The validation of the Reagan Administration’s promises to tackle inflation
depended on the public’s acceptance of its possibility and their translation of this acceptance
into lower inflationary expectations (which in concrete terms, meant lower wage demands from
unionized workers and lower interest rates charged by banks). The gamble that they were
making was that through a series of shocks to the system – not only the sudden reduction in
the supply of money, but also the supply-side driven changes to tax rates and economic
regulations – they could turn the vicious cycle of inflationary expectations and stagnation into
a virtuous circle. Optimistic projections would play a crucial role in this highly speculative
move, validating these economic claims, which in turn would foster the very confidence that
would make them true.
In practice, it turned out, rhetoric was not enough and the metrics were unable to do the
performative work they had been assigned. As the Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs, Beryl
Sprinkel (a former student of Milton Friedman) noted in an apologetic memo to the Treasury
Secretary, Donald Regan, the original projections, which proved to be so faulty, were in fact a
compromise among economic advisors who couldn’t agree on just how radical the rational
expectations and supply-side assumptions should be.3 Greenspan and Murray Weidenbaum,
Chair of Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers, were particularly concerned that projections
that assumed too rapid a decrease in inflation would not be believed, undermining the
credibility of the Administration’s position. So those responsible for the first Reagan budget
fudged the numbers, assuming a massive increase in monetary velocity to make the growth
numbers come out the way that they wanted them to. Yet those inconsistent numbers
themselves turned out to be far from credible to the financial community, and the Reagan
Administration’s efforts to force a shift towards a more speculative economic logic was
undermined by the very metrics they had hoped would support their gamble.
Part of what is so fascinating in unpacking these internal debates (and I am barely
scratching the surface in this brief account), is how they show the friction involved in
translating theory into practice. Monetarist theory argued that the Federal Reserve Board was
able to control the money supply, and yet the Fed’s efforts to do so were a disaster, provoking
unprecedented volatility in interest rates. Monetarist and supply-side theories also insisted
that deficits didn’t matter for inflation, as long as they weren’t monetized (i.e., supported by
the central bank printing money) – and yet deficits clearly did matter as long as the public and
banks believed they did and continued to expect higher inflation as the consequence. Rational
expectations theory predicted that consumers’ and financial actors’ inflationary expectations
would adjust in real-time to the Fed’s declaration of a much lower money supply target – and
yet they didn’t, as members of Reagan’s Administration were forced to admit there was an
important lag in expectations, which would translate into a much more painful transition to a
low inflation world.4
How did they respond to these setbacks? Although Sprinkel, Regan, and others did admit
(at least among themselves) that their assumptions about expectations and the deficit did not
hold true, on the question of whether monetarism was a failure, they engaged in denial:
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Sprinkel, Regan, and Friedman argued that this wasn’t a real monetarist experiment, because
Volcker and the Fed weren’t adhering closely enough to monetarist principles.5 As it turned
out, this was a misdiagnosis, and the main source of the problem was the simple fact that the
deregulation of finance that the Reagan government undertook at the same time had
dramatically changed people’s use of money, altering its velocity and making it extremely
difficult to control.6
This was not a failure caused by a disconnection between the neoliberal fiction and hard
economic reality, as heterodox and critical political economists might argue. Nor was it a
constructive failure engineered by Volcker and others to disrupt and change the game along
neoliberal lines, as Konings suggests. It was instead what I have described elsewhere as a
failure of performativity (Best, 2014: 192), in which the provisional and performative logic of
the policy did not succeed on its own terms. In Koning’s language, it was a failure of the
Reagan Administration’s speculative move – its attempt to use its leverage to lean forward,
gain commitment and connections with others, and engineer a one-way bet in which the
uncertain future would validate its present claims.
How, then, did the neoliberal agenda ultimately succeed and land us where we are today?
Although Volcker and Reagan’s advisors talked a good line about the need to shock the
American economy out of an inflationary spiral through a dramatic move that would shift
expectations overnight, in the end, much of the hard work of lowering inflation was done
through old-fashioned demand-side deflation.7 The neoliberal imaginary and the speculative,
self-fulfilling logic that it entailed, could not work outside the virtual lab of economic theory
until the world had been at least partly reshaped in its image. This was a very messy moment
indeed as the valorization of the new neoliberal imaginary required relying on some very old-
school practices, even as policymakers were struggling to invent a new set of techniques that
would enable the new speculative projections to work. Expectations turned out not to be fully
rational or capable of adjusting instantly to changed policies, but instead were sticky,
pragmatic, and linked to everyday habits inculcated over time. The way these expectations
were translated into practice was also dependent on various non-financial nodes of power, like
that of the unions, who were one of the main casualties of the brutal American and British
recessions, and whose decline made it far easier for neoliberal logics of leverage to operate
smoothly.8
Yet how smooth is the neoliberal logic of leverage, even today? Although neoliberalism
seems only to have gained in self-referential power in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis, if we bring a greater awareness of the contingency and materiality of its day-to-day
reproduction to bear on our analysis, we can begin to see it as less than monolithic. As I have
argued elsewhere (Best, 2019), we should be wary of being seduced by central bankers’ and
economists claims that inflation-targeting is still working – or in fact has ever worked as
promised – when looking under the hood reveals a more contingent and fragile set of metrics
and mechanics. This is not to return to a kind of Polanyian romanticism about the inherently
artificial nature of financial disembedding and the inevitability of a countervailing move to re-
embed economy in society. It is instead to engage in an immanent critique by paying attention
to the messy practicalities of the neoliberal bet.
As Konings so powerfully argues, successful leverage requires a continuous process of
enrolment and networking, of making real and factual present claims by projecting forwards to
a secure and self-confirming future. There is enormous work involved in producing a world that
confirms to neoliberal economic theory, or at least diverges in ways that can be effectively
ignored. Although governing through risk means always seeking to pre-empt the next failure,
we still need to ask ourselves whether this transformation is ever really successful. If not,
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perhaps it is possible to imagine a future in which a series of neoliberal failures – some of
them quite mundane – would allow us to escape the teleological trap that Konings seems to
leave us with; not through a sudden rupture or a romantic re-embedding, but rather through a
slow and uncertain stumble towards a less painfully unfair political and economic world.
Notes
1. For a discussion of the emergence and spread of early accounting techniques that draws on actor
network theory, see Quattrone (2009).
2. Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Donald T. Regan Collection. Box 162, Subject files.
President’s Economic Advisory Board, 1981 & 1982. Various files.
3. Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Donald T. Regan Collection. Box 56, File 4. Memorandum
to Regan from Beryl Sprinkel, Subject: Why our initial forecast went wrong. November 3, 1982.
4. US National Archives II, RG56-UD-11W34. Subject files: Under-Secretary for Monetary Affairs. Box
1, File 3: 1982 CCEA & Related. Talking points for Beryl Sprinkel, Cabinet Council on Economic
Affairs meeting. August 10, 1982.
5. This is remarkably similar to a discussion by Latour of an experiment that depended on a guinea
pig gut to produce its findings, but which turned out to be less reliable than initially hoped: “Just at
the time when we feel comforted in our belief and start to be fully convinced by our own eyes
watching the image, we suddenly feel uneasy because of the fragility of the whole set up. The
Professor, for instance, is swearing at the gut saying it is a ‘bad gut’. The technician who sacrificed
the guinea pig is held responsible and the Professor decides to make a fresh start with a new
animal … Suddenly, we are much further from the paper world of the article. We are now in a
puddle of blood and viscera, slightly nauseated by the extraction of the ileum from this little furry
creature” (Latour, 1987: 66).
6. The veritable war that Sprinkel in particular waged on Volcker, together with Volcker’s very public
criticisms of the deficits implied by Reagan’s supply-side tax-cutting agenda, also points to the
huge internal conflicts over economic policy, suggesting we should not too easily read Volcker’s
actions as the state’s necessary response to excessive financial entanglement (Konings, 2018:
100, 109-10).
7. This dynamic is even clearer in the United Kingdom, where Thatcher backed away from raising
interest rates quite quickly and used budget cuts and unemployment to squeeze inflation out of
the economy (see Best, 2019).
8. The success of the Reagan and Thatcher governments also owed a great deal to their hawkish
stances on national security, another source of affective appeal that combined in complicated
ways with the emotional logic of neoliberalism that Konings (2015) explores in his earlier book.
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